RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article T1 Equilibrium strategies in a multiregional transboundary pollution differential game with spatially distributed controls A1 Frutos Baraja, Francisco Javier de A1 López Pérez, Paula María A1 Martín Herrán, Guiomar AB We analyse a differential game with spatially distributed controls to study a multiregional transboundarypollution problem. The dynamics of the state variable (pollution stock) is defined by atwo dimensional parabolic partial differential equation. The control variables (emissions) are spatiallydistributed variables. The model allows for a, possibly large, number of agents with predeterminedgeographical relationships. For a special functional form previously used in the literature of transboundarypollution dynamic games we analytically characterize the feedback Nash equilibrium. Weshow that at the equilibrium both the level and the location of emissions of each region depend onthe particular geographical relationship among agents. We prove that, even in a simplified model,the geographical considerations can modify the players’ optimal strategies and therefore, the spatialaspects of the model should not be overlooked. PB Elsevier SN 0005-1098 YR 2021 FD 2021 LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/51418 UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/51418 LA spa NO Automatica, 2021, vol. 125, 109411 DS UVaDOC RD 18-sep-2024