RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Equilibrium strategies in a multiregional transboundary pollution differential game with spatially distributed controls
A1 Frutos Baraja, Francisco Javier de
A1 López Pérez, Paula María
A1 Martín Herrán, Guiomar
AB We analyse a differential game with spatially distributed controls to study a multiregional transboundarypollution problem. The dynamics of the state variable (pollution stock) is defined by atwo dimensional parabolic partial differential equation. The control variables (emissions) are spatiallydistributed variables. The model allows for a, possibly large, number of agents with predeterminedgeographical relationships. For a special functional form previously used in the literature of transboundarypollution dynamic games we analytically characterize the feedback Nash equilibrium. Weshow that at the equilibrium both the level and the location of emissions of each region depend onthe particular geographical relationship among agents. We prove that, even in a simplified model,the geographical considerations can modify the players’ optimal strategies and therefore, the spatialaspects of the model should not be overlooked.
PB Elsevier
SN 0005-1098
YR 2021
FD 2021
LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/51418
UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/51418
LA spa
NO Automatica, 2021, vol. 125, 109411
DS UVaDOC
RD 26-dic-2024