RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Interaction and imitation with heterogeneous agents: A misleading evolutionary equilibrium
A1 Cabo García, Francisco José
A1 García González, Ana
K1 1207.06 Teoría de Juegos
K1 5307.15 Teoría Microeconómica
AB In a two-population evolutionary game we analyze the interaction between individualsbelonging to two populations with the same strategy set but different payoffs. Agentsplay a game against individuals in the two populations. They imitate agents belonging tothe same and also the alternative population. When a revising agent is matched with anindividual in the alternative population who plays differently, his expected payoff and theobserved payoff of his partner diverge. Hence, he conjectures the payoff from switching tothe other strategy by weighing what he expected and what he observes. The evolutionarydynamics has a unique asymptotically stable fixed point, which typically differs from theevolutionary stable equilibrium without inter-population imitation. For a collective actiongame we analyze to what extent the compliance rate and the social welfare differ from theNash equilibrium, and how these gaps depend on the confidence that agents assign to whatthey see.
PB Elsevier
YR 2020
FD 2020
LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/51703
UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/51703
LA spa
NO Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, noviembre 2020, 179, p. 152-174.
DS UVaDOC
RD 27-dic-2024