RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Cooperation in a Dynamic Setting with Asymmetric Environmental Valuation and Responsibility
A1 Cabo García, Francisco José
A1 Tidball, Mabel
AB We analyze an environmental agreement as a cooperative differential game between tworegions. The agreement is jointly profitable, since the current contributions in terms of emissions reduction is overcompensated by the benefits of a cleaner environment now and in the future. The regionsare asymmetric in two respects: the valuation of a cleaner environment and the responsibility for thestate of the environment at the beginning of the agreement. Unlike standard dynamic distributionschemes, the proposed mechanism distributes the efforts of lowering current emissions, not the benefitsof a cleaner environment. It is built following an axiomatic approach. It must be time consistent: at anyintermediate time, no country can do better by deviating from cooperation. A benefits pay principle isalso required: the greater one region's relative benefit from cooperation, the greater must be its relativecontribution. A novelty of our approach is the addition of a responsibility or polluter pay principle:a region's relative contribution increases with its responsibility. We characterize a family of dynamicdistribution schemes which satisfy the three desired axioms. Interestingly, the proposed scheme couldequivalently arise from the Nash bargaining solution considering an asymmetric bargaining power.
PB Springer
YR 2021
FD 2021
LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/51704
UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/51704
LA spa
NO Dynamic Games and Applications, 2021
DS UVaDOC
RD 25-abr-2024