RT info:eu-repo/semantics/preprint
T1 Repeated games with endogenous separation
A1 Izquierdo Millán, Segismundo Samuel
A1 Izquierdo, Luis R.
A1 Van Veelen, Matthijs
AB We consider repeated games with endogenous separation – also known as voluntarily separable or voluntary partnership games – and their evolutionary dynamics. We formulate the replicator dynamics for games with endogenous separation, and provide a definition of neutral stability that guarantees Lyapunov stability in the replicator dynamics. We also provide existence results for monomorphic neutrally stable states in games with endogenous separation.
YR 2021
FD 2021
LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/52054
UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/52054
LA eng
NO Producción Científica
NO Organización de Empresas y CIM
DS UVaDOC
RD 01-may-2024