RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: Simple formulas and applications
A1 Izquierdo Millán, Segismundo Samuel
A1 Izquierdo, Luis R.
K1 53 Ciencias Económicas
AB We consider a family of population game dynamics known as Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics. Under these dynamics, when agents are given the opportunity to revise their strategy, they test some of their possible strategies a fixed number of times. Crucially, each strategy is tested against a new randomly drawn set of opponents. The revising agent then chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest in the test, breaking ties according to a given tie-breaking rule. Strict Nash equilibria are rest points of these dynamics, but need not be stable. We provide some simple formulas and algorithms to determine the stability or instability of strict Nash equilibria.
PB Elsevier
SN 0022-0531
YR 2022
FD 2022
LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/55532
UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/55532
LA eng
NO Journal of Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 206, 105553
NO Producción Científica
DS UVaDOC
RD 23-nov-2024