RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling
A1 Izquierdo Millán, Segismundo Samuel
A1 Izquierdo, Luis R.
K1 Closed under payoff sampling
K1 Payoff sampling
K1 Muestreo de pago
AB We consider population games played by procedurally rational players who, when revising their current strategy, test each of their available strategies independently in a series of random matches –i.e., a battery of tests–, and then choose the strategy that performed best in this battery of tests. This revision protocol leads to the so-called payoff-sampling dynamics (aka test-all Best Experienced Payoff dynamics).In this paper we characterize the support of all the rest points of these dynamics in any game and analyze the asymptotic stability of the faces to which they belong. We do this by defining strategy sets closed under payoff sampling, and by proving that the identification of these sets can be made in terms of simple comparisons between some of the payoffs of the game.
PB Elsevier
SN 0899-8256
YR 2023
FD 2023
LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/58449
UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/58449
LA eng
NO Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 138,  2023, Pages 126-142
NO Producción Científica
DS UVaDOC
RD 20-abr-2024