RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Investment in Cleaner Technologies in a Transboundary Pollution Dynamic Game: A Numerical Investigation
A1 Frutos Baraja, Francisco Javier de
A1 Gatón Bustillo, Víctor
A1 López Pérez, Paula María
A1 Martín Herrán, Guiomar
AB Within a noncooperative transboundary pollution dynamic game, we study the strategicimpact of a region’s investment in the adoption of a cleaner technology, as embodied bya reduction in the emission per output ratio, on the equilibrium outcomes and regions’ welfare.The ratio of emissions to output is endogenous and is a decreasing function of thelevel of the stock of cleaner technology. Each region can invest in a cleaner technology inaddition to its control of emissions. Cleaner technology is assumed to be public knowledgeso that both regions benefit from the investment in this technology of an individual region.Pollution damage is modeled as a strictly convex function in the pollution stock.We analyzethe feedback equilibrium of the noncooperative game between two regions played over aninfinite horizon. The formulation of the transboundary pollution dynamic game does not fitany special structure of analytically tractable games such as linear-state or linear-quadratic differential games. We use numerical methods to characterize the feedback equilibrium ofthe noncooperative game. The equilibrium trajectories of the stocks of pollution and cleanertechnology as well the regions’ welfare are compared under different scenarios.
SN 2153-0785
YR 2022
FD 2022
LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/61649
UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/61649
LA spa
NO Dynamic Games and Applications, 2022, vol. 12, p. 813-843
NO Producción Científica
DS UVaDOC
RD 27-dic-2024