RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Positional and conformist effects in voluntary public good provision
A1 Cabo, Francisco
A1 Jean‐Marie, Alain
A1 Tidball, Mabel
K1 conformist agent, inertia, positional agent, public good, social context, static and dynamic game
AB The literature featuring game-theoretical models aimed at explaining the effect of the status concerns on the voluntary provision of a public good is generally focused on snob agents, driven by a desire for exclusiveness. However, the social context literature highlights that status concerns can  give rise to a desire, in some individuals to be different from the ``common herd’’, and in some others to conform with other people. We analyze a two-player public good game under two different settings: The standard case with two positional players, versus the case in which the positional player faces a conformist player. Giving entrance to conformism has two main implications. Strong status concerns by both players can lead to a virtuous cycle in which the conformist player wishes to imitate the contributing behavior of the positional player, and the latter wishes to increase contribution to distinguish herself from the former. Then, the contribution to the public good can be higher than in the case with only snob agents. This higher contribution can increase social welfare, but only if endowments are not too large and the status concern of the positional player is not excessively high.
SN 1097-3923
YR 2024
FD 2024
LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/66774
UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/66774
LA spa
NO Cabo, F., Jean-Marie, A., & Tidball, M. (2024). Positional and conformist effects in voluntary public good provision. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 26, e12685.
DS UVaDOC
RD 17-may-2024