RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Existence of equilibrium in a dynamic supply chain game with vertical coordination, horizontal competition, and complementary goods
A1 Crettez, Bertrand
A1 Hayek, Naila
A1 Martín-Herrán, Guiomar
AB We study supply chain competition and vertical coordination in a linear-quadratic differential game setting.In this setting, supply chains produce complementary goods and  each of them includes a single manufacturer and a single retailer who coordinate their decisions through a revenue-sharing contract including a wholesale price and a fixed sales revenue share. We study a multiple leader-follower Stackelberg game where the manufacturers are the leaders and the retailers are the followers.Competition occurs at both levels of the supply chains.Retailers play Nash and compete in price; manufacturers also play Nash but they compete in choosing their production capacities by exploiting the equilibrium price decisions made by the retailers. We show that open-loop Nash equilibria exist when the manufacturers only receive a wholesale price (there are no longer exploiting the equilibrium price decision made by the retailers, however). When the manufacturers receive both a wholesale-price and a share of the retailers' sales revenues, equilibria generally no longer exist.  The non-existence of an equilibrium stems from the fact that the manufacturers' instant profits are discontinuous functions of their production capacities. This discontinuity leads to a major technical difficulty in that one cannot apply standard optimal control approaches to study the equilibria of the dynamic game.Our results illustrate the possibility that competition between supply chains might not be sustainable when they sell complementary products and rely on  a revenue-sharing agreement.
SN 0377-2217
YR 2024
FD 2024
LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/70754
UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/70754
LA spa
NO European Journal of Operational Research
DS UVaDOC
RD 22-dic-2024