RT info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject
T1 DEVS as a Method to Model and Simulate Combinatorial Double Auctions for E-Procurement
A1 Anton Heredero, Juan De
A1 Ruiz Martín, Cristina
A1 Villafáñez Cardeñoso, Félix Antonio
A1 Poza Garcia, David Jesús
AB The surge in electronic procurement is fostering the proliferation of electronic marketplaces and advanced auctions as primary coordination mechanisms. Among these, combinatorial and double auctions are gaining traction in the procurement sector. However, prevalent implementations often assume participants to be perfectly rational, adhering to predefined behaviors within the auction model. These centralized models, while prevalent, fail to capture the intricate dynamics of real auction environments adequately. Consequently, there is a growing recognition of the necessity for decentralized models within an agentbased framework to simulate such auctions authentically. The contribution of this work is the application of the DEVS formalism to develop a decentralized model for a combinatorial iterative double auction to address the limitations of centralized implementations. The model is formally defined, and a case study is presented to verify it against its centralized version. This is the first step toward accommodating agents with varied behavioral patterns within auction simulations.
PB IEEE Xplore
SN 979-8-3315-3420-2
YR 2024
FD 2024
LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/74191
UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/74191
LA eng
NO 2024 Winter Simulation Conference. Orlando, FL, USA
DS UVaDOC
RD 23-ene-2025