RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 The effects of decision timing for pricing and marketing efforts in a supply chain with competing manufacturers
A1 Karray, Salma
A1 Martín‐Herrán, Guiomar
AB This paper investigates the impact of decision timing for pricing and marketing efforts in a supply chain ledby competing manufacturers.We develop and solve six games to consider the scenarios (games) where pricesand marketing efforts (ME) are decided simultaneously, and when they are not (i.e., ME is set either before orafter prices). We examine these three scenarios for the benchmark case of a bilateral monopolistic channel,then extend the analysis to a supply chain with competing manufacturers. We identify the optimal decisiontiming by comparing equilibrium profits and strategies across games in each supply chain setup. We findthat a monopolistic manufacturer always prefers that prices and ME be decided simultaneously. However,this result does not hold when product competition is taken into account. The optimal decision timing forcompeting manufacturers depends on the retailer’s and manufacturers’ ME effectiveness levels as well ason competition intensity. Specifically, when ME are not very effective, a simultaneous decision scenario ispreferred because it provides the advantage of higher profit margins or sales. However, for highly effectiveME, manufacturers prefer to decouple ME and pricing decisions. The retailer’s optimal scenario is either tomake all decisions simultaneously or to choose prices prior to ME. This means that supply chain firms canface conflict due to the decision timing for prices and ME.
SN 0969-6016
YR 2024
FD 2024
LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/75401
UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/75401
LA eng
NO International Transactions in Operational Research 31, 568-615, 2024
NO Producción Científica
DS UVaDOC
RD 29-mar-2025