RT info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject T1 Modelling of a Combinatorial Double Auction using DEVS A1 Anton Heredero, Juan De A1 Ruiz Martín, Cristina A1 Villafáñez Cardeñoso, Félix Antonio A1 Poza Garcia, David Jesús A1 López Paredes, Adolfo AB Combinatorial auctions have emerged as suitable mechanisms to efficientlycoordinate supply and demand in electronic markets. Most of the combinatorialauction designs found in the literature assume that all market participantsare perfectly rational and thus develop centralized simulation models according tothat premise. However, participants in real-world auctions tend to exhibit boundedrationality, which requires a decentralized modelling approach. An absence of specializedsimulation frameworks for decentralized implementation of auctions hasbeen noted. To cover this gap, this work presents a combinatorial iterative doubleauction model using the Discrete Event System Specification (DEVS) formalismthat can be employed to simulate a combinatorial auction in a decentralizedfashion. PB Springer Nature SN 978-3-031-82333-6 YR 2025 FD 2025 LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/75907 UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/75907 LA eng NO Madrid, Spain, July 4-5, 2024 DS UVaDOC RD 07-jul-2025