RT info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject
T1 Modelling of a Combinatorial Double Auction using DEVS
A1 Anton Heredero, Juan De
A1 Ruiz Martín, Cristina
A1 Villafáñez Cardeñoso, Félix Antonio
A1 Poza Garcia, David Jesús
A1 López Paredes, Adolfo
AB Combinatorial auctions have emerged as suitable mechanisms to efficientlycoordinate supply and demand in electronic markets. Most of the combinatorialauction designs found in the literature assume that all market participantsare perfectly rational and thus develop centralized simulation models according tothat premise. However, participants in real-world auctions tend to exhibit boundedrationality, which requires a decentralized modelling approach. An absence of specializedsimulation frameworks for decentralized implementation of auctions hasbeen noted. To cover this gap, this work presents a combinatorial iterative doubleauction model using the Discrete Event System Specification (DEVS) formalismthat can be employed to simulate a combinatorial auction in a decentralizedfashion.
PB Springer Nature
SN 978-3-031-82333-6
YR 2025
FD 2025
LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/75907
UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/75907
LA eng
NO Madrid, Spain, July 4-5, 2024
DS UVaDOC
RD 29-jul-2025