RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Capacity coordination in a duopoly with perfect cournot complements
A1 Crettez, Bertrand
A1 Hayek, Naila
A1 Martín-Herrán, Guiomar
AB We study capacity coordination in a dynamic duopoly with perfect Cournot complements where firms face investment adjustment costs when choosing their production capacities. We show that optimal capacities must become identical from a certain date on. We  perform a numerical analysis of the optimal investment and capital paths and the optimal date at which capacities become equal. We find  that eliminating overcapacity does not always mean decreasing the highest initial capacity (this is especially true when the firm with the lowest initial capacity has the highest depreciation rate). Moreover, it is possible that the investment of the firm with the lowest initial capacity is non-monotonic.
SN 0254-5330
YR 2025
FD 2025
LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/78283
UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/78283
LA eng
NO Annals of Operations Research 352, 75-103 (2025)
DS UVaDOC
RD 19-oct-2025