RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Environmental Regulation and Inspection Delegation with Stock Pollution
A1 Arguedas, Carmen
A1 Cabo, Francisco
A1 Martín-Herrán, Guiomar
AB In this paper, we model a differential game played `a la Stackelberg between a regulatorand a polluting firm in a stock pollution context. The regulator can be a singlebody deciding on the emission standard and the probability of inspection overtimeas functions of the pollution stock. Alternatively, the regulator can delegate the inspectionactivities to a local agency that maximizes revenues coming from fines netof inspection costs. Although the objective of the agency departs from social welfare,decentralization can be welfare improving, crucially depending on the type of strategicinteraction between the local agency and the polluting firm, as well as on the firmanticipating the effects of current pollution decisions on future regulatory policy. Upto our kowledge, this is the first paper dealing with hierarchical regulation in a stockpollution context.
SN 0924-6460
YR 2025
FD 2025
LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/78369
UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/78369
LA eng
NO Environmental and Resource Economics, 2025
DS UVaDOC
RD 19-oct-2025