RT info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
T1 La construcción de la sensación de agencia: un enfoque desde la neurociencia y la filosofía de la mente
A1 Molinero Moles, Ignacio
A2 Universidad de Valladolid. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras
K1 Agency
K1 Self
K1 Confabulation
K1 Ego-dualism
K1 Agencia
K1 Yo
K1 Fabulación
K1 Dualismo del ego
K1 72 Filosofía
AB This essay proposes a radical critique of the concept of agency from an interdisciplinary approach between neuroscience and philosophy of mind, adopting an eliminativist stance. It argues that agency is not an ontologically real property of the subject, but a perceptual and narrative construct generated by distributed brain mechanisms, conditioned by retrospective inferences and cognitive biases. Through the analysis of neuroscientific models and the study of pathologies, argues that the sense of agency is malleable, fallible and fabricated. Both the classical substantialist, individualist and relational conceptions are questioned, including Galen Strawson's position, which will require more detail than the others. The above positions are criticized —to a greater or lesser extent— for being ego-dualistic. It is concluded that even the most elementary forms of self-experience are based on opaque and confabulatory processes that do not justify a strong ontology of self or agent. This position has relevant implications for clinical ethics, moral responsibility, and theories of free will, and points toward a more fine-tuned and scientifically informed understanding of human subjectivity as a construct rather than as a substantial entity.
YR 2025
FD 2025
LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/79941
UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/79941
LA spa
NO Departamento de Filosofía (Filosofía, Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia, Teoría e Historia de la Educación, Filosofía Moral, Estética y Teoría de las Artes)
DS UVaDOC
RD 07-dic-2025