RT info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
T1 Games with Costly Endogenous Separation
A1 Gutiérrez-Mielgo, Alejandro
A1 Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo
A1 Izquierdo Millán, Segismundo Samuel
A2 Universidad de Valladolid.
K1 Endogenous separation
K1 Conditional dissociation
K1 Voluntarily repeated games
K1 1207.06 Teoría de Juegos
AB Games with costly endogenous separation are repeated games where players havethe option to leave their current partnership (with some cost) and keep on playingin a newly-formed partnership. Players can also be separated by exogenous factors.We study equilibria in these games. As a relevant case of application, cooperation ina repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma is compromised in environments where individualsare free to leave their partners, since defectors can exploit cooperators and moveon. Previous studies have explored diverse mechanisms to prevent defect-and-leavestrategies from taking hold. We show that, for large enough separation costs, notonly full cooperation, but actually any symmetric sequence of outcomes can be sup-ported as a (path-protecting) neutrally stable state, which is Lyapunov stable underthe replicator dynamics.
YR 2025
FD 2025
LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/80280
UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/80280
LA spa
NO Organización de Empresa y CIM
DS UVaDOC
RD 03-dic-2025