RT info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
T1 Conventions in Repeated Games with Endogenous Separation
A1 Izquierdo Millán, Segismundo Samuel
A1 Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo
K1 Endogenous separation
K1 Neutral stability
K1 Voluntarily repeated games
K1 1207.06 Teoría de Juegos
AB Games with endogenous separation are repeated games where players have theoption to leave their current partnership and keep on playing in a newly-formedpartnership. Arguably, most repeated interactions in real life fall into this category.We present a general framework to analyze equilibria in games with endogenousseparation, with a special focus on social conventions, i.e., stable strategies that areresistant to direct invasion by any conceivable strategy. Our search for conventionsleads to path-protecting strategies, which play a similar role to trigger strategiesin standard (fixed-partnership) repeated games. We provide a constructive proofof existence for path-protecting strategies, and a folk theorem for neutrally stableconventions.
YR 2025
FD 2025
LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/80283
UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/80283
LA eng
NO Producción Científica
NO Organization de Empresas y CIM
DS UVaDOC
RD 15-ene-2026