RT info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject
T1 A DEVS-Based Study of Social Welfare Evolution in Iterative Combinatorial Double Auctions
A1 Anton Heredero, Juan De
A1 Poza Garcia, David Jesús
A1 Ruiz Martín, Cristina
A1 Villafáñez Cardeñoso, Félix Antonio
K1 Combinatorial Auction
K1 DEVS
K1 Social Welfare
AB Combinatorial double auctions provide an efficient mechanism for resource allocation, maximizing social welfare without requiring private information from participants. However, depending on specific auction conditions, the number of rounds required for convergence can be significantly high. In this work, we extend a previously developed DEVS-based auction model to study the dynamics of social welfare evolution throughout the auction process. While the original model identifies the allocation that maximizes social welfare, our extension enables tracking the proportion of the optimal social welfare achieved at each round. This analysis provides insights into the auction's convergence behavior and serves as the foundation for developing an approach that helps auctioneers select appropriate parameters to achieve a sufficiently good outcome within a reasonable number of rounds in real-world scenarios.
PB Springer
SN 978-3-032-10126-6
YR 2026
FD 2026
LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/81357
UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/81357
LA eng
NO Producción Científica
DS UVaDOC
RD 02-feb-2026