RT info:eu-repo/semantics/preprint
T1 Stable strategies in repeated games with endogenous separation
A1 Izquierdo Millán, Segismundo Samuel
A1 Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo
K1 Teoría de juegos evolutiva
K1 Endogenous separation; conventions; neutral stability; path-protecting strategy; voluntarily repeated games
AB Games with endogenous separation are repeated games where players havethe option to leave their current partnership and keep on playing in a newly-formed partnership. Arguably, most repeated interactions in real life fall intothis category. We present a general framework to analyze equilibria in gameswith endogenous separation, extending concepts from evolutionary game the-ory, and with a focus on neutrally stable strategies, i.e., stable strategies thatare resistant to direct invasion by any alternative strategy. We introduce path-protecting strategies, which play a similar role to trigger strategies in standard(fixed-partnership) repeated games, and we provide a constructive proof of theirexistence. We also present a Folk Theorem for path-protecting strategies in thesegames.
YR 2026
FD 2026
LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/81680
UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/81680
LA eng
NO Producción Científica
NO Organización de Empresas y CIM
DS UVaDOC
RD 26-ene-2026