RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Selecting Constitutional Judges Randomly
A1 Vandamme, Pierre‐Étienne
A1 Bello Hutt, Donald
AB This article discusses from the perspective of democratic theory an innovative proposal for the selection of constitutional, supreme court, or federal judges that aims at combining the values of expertise and political independence. It consists in combining a certification process – selecting a pool of properly qualified candidates – with a random selection among this pool. We argue that such selection procedure would better respect the separation of powers and the specific legitimacy of courts, and we champion this two-stage mechanism vis-à-vis other, more traditionally employed, selection procedures. We then deal with a diversity of objections to our proposal and conclude by taking stock of both its virtues and limitations.
PB Wiley
SN 1424-7755
YR 2020
FD 2020
LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/83025
UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/83025
LA spa
NO Swiss Political Science Review, vol. 27, no. 1, 107-127
NO Producción Científica
DS UVaDOC
RD 24-feb-2026