RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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A1 Socol, Yehoshua
A2 Ediciones Universidad de Valladolid
K1 Historia
AB This article explains why the Israeli Army—despite Israel’s economic strength and material superiority—struggles to translate battlefield success into decisive victory, in stark contrast to 1967. The core claim is institutional: over the past decades a welfare-state political economy, the diffusion of real power to unelected legal-bureaucratic actors, and the internalization of expansive “international norms” (notably proportionality as understood by military lawyers) have reshaped incentives, leadership selection, and rules of engagement in ways that privilege risk-averse legality over victory. The paper concludes with suggestion of reforms to re-center victory on territorial defeat and replacement of hostile regimes/social infrastructures, to re-scope military law and enforcement. The paper also suggests to reconsider attitude to hostages and reduce dependence on foreign actors.
SN 2255-2715
YR 2026
FD 2026
LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/83644
UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/83644
LA eng
NO Journal of the Sociology and Theory of Religion; Núm. 1 (2026) pags. 130-153
DS UVaDOC
RD 22-mar-2026