RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 A general model for dealing with ranking voting systems
A1 Llamazares Rodríguez, Bonifacio
K1 Decision support systems, ranking voting systems, positional voting systems, uncertain weights, surrogate weights, dominated winner paradox, absolute winner paradox
AB A key problem in decision-making is selecting a winning candidate or establishing a global ranking for a set of candidates when individuals' preferences are expressed through linear orders. Scoring rules are a specific case of positional voting systems (PVSs) that are widely used in sports competitions. Likewise, some scoring rules, such as the Borda rule and plurality, have also been extensively analyzed in the field of social choice. However, the choice of the scoring vector may significantly influence the results, leading to the development of models that avoid subjective vector selection. In this paper, we introduce a general model that encompasses some previous proposals present in the literature. Our model does not have an important deficiency that some other models do, such as the fact that the relative order between two candidates may change even if there is no variation in the positions obtained by those candidates. We give an explicit formula for calculating candidate scores, enabling direct determination of winners or rankings without solving the model for each candidate, and we also analyze the fulfillment of some well-known properties. Likewise, through theoretical analysis and examples, we identify and rule out specific PVSs that may yield questionable outcomes.
PB Elsevier
SN 0377-2217
YR 2026
FD 2026
LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/83794
UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/83794
LA eng
NO European Journal of Operational Research, Marzo 2026, vol. 329, n. 3, p. 1004-1014
NO Producción Científica
DS UVaDOC
RD 24-mar-2026