TY  - JOUR 
AU  - García González, Ana
AU  - Cabo García, Francisco José
PY  - 2019
SN  - 1432-1386
UR  - http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/37880
AB  - This paper studies a two-population evolutionary game in a new setting in between a symmetric and an asymmetric evolutionary model. It distinguishes two types of agents: Sanchos, whose payoffs are defined by a prisoner’s dilemma game, and Quixotes,...
LA  - eng
PB  - Springer
KW  - Two-population evolutionary game Heterogeneous preferences Symmetric and asymmetric games
TI  - Interaction and imitation in a world of Quixotes and Sanchos
DO  - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-019-00620-3
ER  -