TY  - CHAP 
AU  - Cabo García, Francisco José
AU  - García González, Ana
AU  - Molpeceres Abellá, María de las Mercedes
PY  - 2020
SN  - 978-3-030-19107-8
UR  - http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/37883
AB  - This paper studies a two-population evolutionary game in a new setting
in between a symmetric and an asymmetric evolutionary model. It distinguishes two
types of agents: Sanchos, whose payoffs are defined by a prisoner’s dilemma game,
and Quixotes,...
LA  - eng
PB  - Springer International Publishing
KW  - Two-population evolutionary game Heterogeneous preferences Prisoner’s dilemma game Snowdrift game Social norms
TI  - Compliance with Social Norms as an Evolutionary Stable Equilibrium
ER  -