TY  - JOUR 
AU  - Martín-Herrán, Guiomar
AU  - Ramos, Lais
PY  - 2025
UR  - https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/73010
AB  - This paper analyzes the dynamic interaction between an environmental regulator and a polluting firm in a stock pollution Stackelberg game, where the regulator acts as the leader and the firm as the follower. The firm must determine the emissions...
LA  - spa
KW  - Dynamic regulation
KW  - Evasion
KW  - Incomplete information
KW  - Stackelbeg differential games
TI  - Environmental regulation and tax evasion when the regulator has incomplete information
DO  - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101475
ER  -