TY  - GEN 
AU  - Anton Heredero, Juan De
AU  - Poza Garcia, David Jesús
AU  - Ruiz Martín, Cristina
AU  - Villafáñez Cardeñoso, Félix Antonio
PY  - 2026
SN  - 978-3-032-10126-6
UR  - https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/81357
AB  - Combinatorial double auctions provide an efficient mechanism for resource allocation, maximizing social welfare without requiring private information from participants. However, depending on specific auction conditions, the number of rounds required...
LA  - eng
PB  - Springer
KW  - Combinatorial Auction
KW  - DEVS
KW  - Social Welfare
TI  - A DEVS-Based Study of Social Welfare Evolution in Iterative Combinatorial Double Auctions
DO  - 10.1007/978-3-032-10126-6_31
ER  -