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Título
Modelling of a Combinatorial Double Auction using DEVS
Autor
Congreso
18th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Industrial Management XXVIII Congreso de Ingeniería de Organización
Año del Documento
2025
Editorial
Springer Nature
Documento Fuente
Madrid, Spain, July 4-5, 2024
Zusammenfassung
Combinatorial auctions have emerged as suitable mechanisms to efficiently
coordinate supply and demand in electronic markets. Most of the combinatorial
auction designs found in the literature assume that all market participants
are perfectly rational and thus develop centralized simulation models according to
that premise. However, participants in real-world auctions tend to exhibit bounded
rationality, which requires a decentralized modelling approach. An absence of specialized
simulation frameworks for decentralized implementation of auctions has
been noted. To cover this gap, this work presents a combinatorial iterative double
auction model using the Discrete Event System Specification (DEVS) formalism
that can be employed to simulate a combinatorial auction in a decentralized
fashion.
ISBN
978-3-031-82333-6
Version del Editor
Idioma
eng
Tipo de versión
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
Derechos
restrictedAccess
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