RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Manufacturer defensive and offensive advertising in competing distribution channels
A1 Martín Herrán, Guiomar
A1 Sigué, Simon-Pierre
AB This paper investigates how two competing manufacturers should invest in defensive and offensive advertising in a two-segment market and whether they should each adopt a decentralized or an integrated channel if their goal is to maximize total channel profits.We find that manufacturers in decentralized channels can exclusively undertake either of the two types of advertising or combine the two at the equilibrium. In integrated channels, they can either combine the two or exclusively undertake defensive advertising. When multiple equilibria exist, strategies that combine both types of advertising should be preferred to exclusive defensive advertising strategies, which are better than exclusive offensive advertising strategies. Also, total channel profits are higher in decentralized channels than in integrated channels when the brands are moderately or highly substitutable.Conversely, total channel profits of integrated channels are higher than those of decentralized channels inareas where the brands are relatively differentiated and the offensive advertising retaliatory capacity of therival is stronger. Theoretical and managerial implications of these findings are discussed.
PB Wiley
SN 0969-6016
YR 2020
FD 2020
LK https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/51424
UL https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/51424
LA spa
NO International Transactions in Operational Research, 2020, vol. 27. p. 958-983
DS UVaDOC
RD 30-abr-2024