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dc.contributor.authorLlamazares Rodríguez, Bonifacio 
dc.contributor.authorPeña García, María Teresa 
dc.date.accessioned2016-12-09T12:16:00Z
dc.date.available2016-12-09T12:16:00Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.citationGroup Decision and Negotiation, 2015, Vol. 24, Issue 5, pp 777–801es
dc.identifier.issn0926-2644es
dc.identifier.urihttp://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/21498
dc.descriptionProducción Científicaes
dc.description.abstractPositional voting systems are a class of voting systems where voters rank order the candidates from best to worst and a set of winners is selected using the positions of the candidates in the voters’ preference orders. Although scoring rules are the best known positional voting systems, this class includes other voting systems proposed in the literature as, for example, the Majoritarian Compromise or the q-Approval Fallback Bargaining. In this paper we show that some of these positional voting systems can be integrated in a model based on cumulative standings functions. The proposed model allows us to establish a general framework for the analysis of these voting systems, to extend to them some results in the literature for the particular case of the scoring rules, and also facilitates the study of the social choice properties considered in the paper: monotonicity, Pareto-optimality, immunity to the absolute winner paradox, Condorcet consistency, immunity to the absolute loser paradox and immunity to the Condorcet loser paradox.es
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfes
dc.language.isoenges
dc.publisherSpringer Verlages
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subjectVoto - Matemáticases
dc.titlePositional Voting Systems Generated by Cumulative Standings Functionses
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10726-014-941es
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://link.springer.com/es
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage777es
dc.identifier.publicationissue5es
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage801es
dc.identifier.publicationtitleGroup Decision and Negotiationes
dc.identifier.publicationvolume24es
dc.peerreviewedSIes
dc.description.projectMinisterio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad (ECO2011-24200)es
dc.description.projectMinisterio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad (ECO2012-32178)es
dc.description.projectJunta de Castilla y León (programa de apoyo a proyectos de investigación – Ref. VA066U13)es
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International


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