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    Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar este ítem:http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/27722

    Título
    Cooperation for Sustainable Forest Management: An Empirical Differential Game Approach
    Autor
    Andrés Domenech, Pablo
    Martín Herrán, GuiomarAutoridad UVA Orcid
    Zaccour, Georges
    Año del Documento
    2015
    Descripción
    Producción Científica
    Documento Fuente
    Ecological Economics, 117, 118-128, 2015.
    Zusammenfassung
    We model the role of theworld's forests as a major carbon sink and consider the impact that forest depletion has on the accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere. Two types of agents are considered: forest owners who exploit the forest and draw economic revenues in the form of timber and agricultural use of deforested land; and a non-forest-owner group who pollutes and suffers the negative externality of having a decreasing forest stock. We retrieve the cooperative solution for this game and show the cases in which cooperation enables a partial reduction in the negative externality. We analyze when it is jointly profitable to abate emissions, when it is profitable to reduce net deforestation, and when it is optimal to do both (abate and reduce net deforestation). Assuming that the players adopt the Nash bargaining solution to share the total dividend of cooperation, we determine the total amount that the non-forest owners have to transfer to forest owners. Next, we define a time-consistent payment schedule that allocates over time the total transfer.
    Revisión por pares
    SI
    Patrocinador
    The second author's research is partially supported by MEC under projects, ECO2011- 24352, and ECO2014-52343-P, co-financed by FEDER funds, and COST Action IS1104. The third author's research is supported by NSERC, Canada.
    Idioma
    eng
    URI
    http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/27722
    Derechos
    openAccess
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    • DEP20 - Artículos de revista [181]
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    AndresDomenech et al. (Ecol. Eco 2015).pdf
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