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    Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar este ítem:http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/32333

    Título
    The endogenous determination of retirement age and Social Security benefits
    Autor
    Cabo García, Francisco JoséAutoridad UVA Orcid
    García González, AnaAutoridad UVA Orcid
    Año del Documento
    2014
    Editorial
    Cambridge University Press
    Descripción
    Producción Científica
    Documento Fuente
    Macroeconomic Dynamics, 18, pp. 93-113.
    Zusammenfassung
    An ageing population in modern societies has put stress on public pension systems. To prevent Social Security deficits from increasing to unbounded stocks of public debt we focus on two policies: reducing the generosity of pension benefits, determined by the government, and post- poning the effective retirement age, chosen by employees. An atomistic employee would disregard the effect of his retirement decision on the public debt and would retire as soon as possible. Conversely, an ideal farsighted agency considering all current and future employees would postpone re- tirement, thereby alleviating the pressure on public debt and allowing for a more generous long-run pension. The government may design a proper incentive strategy to induce myopic atomistic decision-makers, to act non-myopically. This strategy is a two-part incentive with non-linear dependence on the stock of public debt. It is credible if deceiving em- ployees slightly adjust their retirement age decisions to increments in the public debt.
    Materias (normalizadas)
    Differential games
    Pension systems
    Palabras Clave
    Public pension system
    effective retirement age
    differential games
    credibility of incentive equilibrium
    ISSN
    1365-1005 (Print), 1469-8056 (Online)
    Revisión por pares
    SI
    DOI
    10.1017/S1365100512000296
    Patrocinador
    MICINN under project ECO2008- 01551/ECON.
    Version del Editor
    https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/macroeconomic-dynamics/article/endogenous-determination-of-retirement-age-and-social-security-benefits/9EE091C1A9DC1379CEF4202FB4E21EA7
    Idioma
    spa
    URI
    http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/32333
    Derechos
    openAccess
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    • DEP20 - Artículos de revista [181]
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    Dateien zu dieser Ressource
    Nombre:
    CaboGarciarerevised.pdf
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