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    Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar este ítem:http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/32413

    Título
    Promotion of cooperation when benefits come in the future: A water transfer case
    Autor
    Cabo García, Francisco JoséAutoridad UVA Orcid
    Tidball, Mabel
    Año del Documento
    2017
    Editorial
    Elsevier
    Descripción
    Producción Científica
    Documento Fuente
    Resource and Energy Economics, 47, pp. 56-71.
    Résumé
    This paper presents a two-regime differential game, with a first period in which two countries cooperate in a joint investment project to construct a specific infrastructure. This period ends when the infrastructure is finished, which serves to increase each player’s welfare in a subsequent non-cooperative game played by the two countries thereafter. We define an imputation distribution procedure (IDP) to share the investment costs during cooperation according to each player’ future benefits. We prove that the IDP is time consistent if at any time within the cooperative period each country’s share on the surplus to go is equal to or converges towards the country’s relative gains from the existence of the infrastructure (real- ized in the subsequent non-cooperative period). Furthermore, we obtain the instantaneous side-payment scheme which makes the IDP feasible. The mechanism is studied for a joint investment project to build a water canal to transfer water between a surplus and a deficit river basin.
    Materias (normalizadas)
    Environmental Economics
    Differential games
    Palabras Clave
    Cooperative differential game
    non-cooperative differential game
    imputation distribution procedure
    instantaneous side-payment
    time-consistent solution
    ISSN
    0928-7655
    Revisión por pares
    SI
    DOI
    10.1016/j.reseneeco.2016.12.001
    Patrocinador
    MEC project ECO2014-52343-P, co- financed by FEDER funds. COST Action IS1104 “The EU in the new economic complex geography: models, tools and policy evaluation”.
    Version del Editor
    https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0928765516300574
    Idioma
    eng
    URI
    http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/32413
    Derechos
    openAccess
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    • DEP20 - Artículos de revista [181]
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    cooperation_Preprint.pdf
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    Universidad de Valladolid

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