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    Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar este ítem:http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/37933

    Título
    Non-linear incentive equilibrium strategies for a transboundary pollution differential game
    Autor
    Frutos Baraja, Francisco Javier deAutoridad UVA Orcid
    Martín Herrán, GuiomarAutoridad UVA Orcid
    Año del Documento
    2019
    Editorial
    Springer
    Descripción
    Producción Científica
    Documento Fuente
    Games in Management Science-Essays in honor of Georges Zaccour. P.O. Pineau, S.P. Sigué, S. Tabubi (eds.). Springer. Doi. 10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8. ISBN: 978-3-030-19106-1
    Résumé
    In this paper we apply non-linear incentive strategies to sustain over time an agreement. We illustrate the use of these strategies in a linear-quadratic transboundary pollution differential game. The incentive strategies are constructed in such a way that in the long run the pollution stock (the state variable) is close to the steady state of the pollution stock under the cooperative mode of play. The non-linear incentive functions depend on the emission rates (control variables) of both players and on the current value of the pollution stock. The credibility of the incentive equilibrium strategies is analyzed and the performance of open-loop and feedback incentive strategies is compared in their role of helping to sustain an agreement over time. We present numerical experiments to illustrate the results.
    ISSN
    0884-8289
    Revisión por pares
    SI
    DOI
    10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8
    Patrocinador
    This research is partially supported by MINECO under projects MTM2016-78995-P (AEI) and ECO2014-52343-P and ECO2017-82227-P (AEI) and by Junta de Castilla y León VA024P17 and VA105G18 co-financed by FEDER funds (EU)
    Idioma
    spa
    URI
    http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/37933
    Tipo de versión
    info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersion
    Derechos
    openAccess
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