Repeated games with endogenous separation

Título

dc.contributor.author	Izquierdo Millán, Segismundo Samuel
dc.contributor.author	Izquierdo, Luis R.
dc.contributor.author	Van Veelen, Matthijs
dc.date.accessioned	2022-02-15T13:26:26Z
dc.date.available	2022-02-15T13:26:26Z
dc.date.issued	2021
dc.identifier.uri	https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/52054
dc.description	Producción Científica	es
dc.description.abstract	We consider repeated games with endogenous separation – also known as voluntarily separable or voluntary partnership games – and their evolutionary dynamics. We formulate the replicator dynamics for games with endogenous separation, and provide a definition of neutral stability that guarantees Lyapunov stability in the replicator dynamics. We also provide existence results for monomorphic neutrally stable states in games with endogenous separation.	es
dc.description.sponsorship	Organización de Empresas y CIM	es
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	es
dc.language.iso	eng	es
dc.rights.accessRights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess	es
dc.title	Repeated games with endogenous separation	es
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/preprint	es
dc.type.hasVersion	info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersion	es