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dc.contributor.authorLlamazares Rodríguez, Bonifacio 
dc.contributor.authorPérez Asurmendi, Patrizia
dc.date.accessioned2016-12-09T10:02:23Z
dc.date.available2016-12-09T10:02:23Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.citationInformation Sciences, 2015, Vol. 299, p. 209–220es
dc.identifier.urihttp://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/21493
dc.descriptionProducción Científicaes
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we study to what extent majorities based on difference in support leads to triple-acyclic collective decisions. These majorities, which take into account voters’ intensities of preference between pairs of alternatives through reciprocal preference relations, require to the winner alternative to exceed the support for the other alternative in a difference fixed before the election. Depending on that difference, i.e., on the threshold of support, and on some requirements on the individual rationality of the voters, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for avoiding cycles of three alternatives on the collective decision.es
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfes
dc.language.isoenges
dc.publisherElsevieres
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subjectVoto - Matemáticases
dc.titleTriple-acyclicity in majorities based on difference in supportes
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2014.11.049es
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/es
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage209es
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage220es
dc.identifier.publicationtitleInformation Scienceses
dc.identifier.publicationvolume299es
dc.peerreviewedSIes
dc.description.projectMinisterio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad (ECO2012-32178)
dc.description.projectJunta de Castilla y León (programa de apoyo a proyectos de investigación – Ref. VA066U13)
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International


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