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Equilibrium strategies in a multiregional transboundary pollution differential game with spatially distributed controls
Año del Documento
Automatica 125, Art. No. 109411, 2021
We analyse a differential game with spatially distributed controls to study a multiregional transboundary pollution problem. The dynamics of the state variable (pollution stock) is defined by a two dimensional parabolic partial differential equation. The control variables (emissions) are spatially distributed variables. The model allows for a, possibly large, number of agents with predetermined geographical relationships. For a special functional form previously used in the literature of transboundary pollution dynamic games we analytically characterize the feedback Nash equilibrium. We show that at the equilibrium both the level and the location of emissions of each region depend on the particular geographical relationship among agents. We prove that, even in a simplified model, the geographical considerations can modify the players’ optimal strategies and therefore, the spatial aspects of the model should not be overlooked.
Revisión por pares
This research is partially supported by MEC, Spain under projects PID2019- 104141GB-I00 (AEI) (first author) and ECO2017-82227-P (AEI) (third author), and by Junta de Castilla y León, Spain VA169P20 and VA105G18 co-financed by FEDER funds (EU).
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