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    Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar este ítem:https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/61650

    Título
    An integrative framework of cooperative advertising with reference price effects
    Autor
    Martín Herrán, GuiomarAutoridad UVA Orcid
    Sigué, Simon-Pierre
    Año del Documento
    2023
    Documento Fuente
    Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, 2023, Vol. 70, Article Number 103166,
    Résumé
    The importance of reference price effects in consumer behavior and marketing decisions is now well established in the literature. However, research on the impact of these effects on cooperative advertising decisions in marketing channels remains very limited. A two-period model is developed to analyze how members of a bilateral monopoly channel should set pricing and advertising decisions in a context where first-period price serves as the reference price of second period. By solving a Stackelberg game where the manufacturer is the leader, nine feasible equilibria are endogenously obtained. These equilibria correspond to different combinations (scenarios) of the respective decisions of the retailer and manufacturer to undertake or not and to support or not local advertising in each period. The profitability of each of these scenarios for the players and their pricing and advertising strategies over time depend, among others, on how sensitive consumers are to price changes over time.
    ISSN
    0969-6989
    Revisión por pares
    SI
    DOI
    10.1016/j.jretconser.2022.103166
    Idioma
    spa
    URI
    https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/61650
    Tipo de versión
    info:eu-repo/semantics/draft
    Derechos
    openAccess
    Aparece en las colecciones
    • DEP20 - Artículos de revista [183]
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    JRCS_Reference Price-Coop Ads_FINAL_Sep_2022.pdf
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