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Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar este ítem: http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/27720
Título: Price Coordination in Distribution Channels: A Dynamic Perspective
Autor: Martín-Herrán, Guiomar
Taboubi, Sihem
Año del Documento: 2015
Descripción: Producción Científica
Documento Fuente: European Journal of Operational Research 240, 401-414, 2015.
Resumen: In this study, we investigate two important questions related to dynamic pricing in distribution channels: (i) Are coordinated pricing decisions efficient in a context where prices have carry-over effects on demand? (ii) Should fi rms practice a skimming or a penetration strategy if they choose to coordinate or to decentralize their activities? To answer these questions, we consider a differential game that takes place in a bilateral monopoly where the past retail prices paid by consumers contribute to the building of a reference price. The latter is used by consumers as a benchmark to evaluate the value of the product, and by fi rms to decide whether to adopt a skimming or a penetration strategy. We then compute and compare strategies, total channel profi ts and individual profits under vertical integration and decentralization at steady state and along the optimal time-paths. One of our main fi ndings states that, for some values of the initial reference price, there is a time interval where channel decentralization performs better than coordination. During this transition period, at least one of the channel members could be tempted to end his cooperation, especially if he is not farsighted and if there are no binding agreements with the other channel partners.
Revisión por Pares: SI
Patrocinador: The rst author's research is partially supported by MICINN under projects ECO2008-01551/ECON, ECO2011-24352, co- nanced by FEDER funds and the COST Action IS1104 \The EU in the new economic complex geography: models, tools and policy evaluation". The second author's research is supported by NSERC, Canada.
Idioma: eng
URI: http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/27720
Derechos: info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
Aparece en las colecciones:DEP20 - Artículos de revista

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