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    • DEP20 - Artículos de revista
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    Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar este ítem:http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/36226

    Título
    On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives
    Autor
    Llamazares Rodríguez, Bonifaciountranslated ORCID
    Año del Documento
    2013
    Editorial
    Springer
    Descripción
    Producción Científica
    Documento Fuente
    Review of Economic Design, 2013, vol. 17, n. 3, p. 239-248.
    Abstract
    Voting systems between two alternatives have been widely studied in the literature of Social Choice. One of the results given by Fishburn (The Theory of Social Choice. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1973) allows us to characterize anonymous, neutral and monotonic voting systems by means of functions satisfying adequate conditions. From among all kinds of functions, the class of affine functions is highly interesting because from them it is possible to obtain the voting systems most used in practice. In this paper we analyze the structure of the set of these functions and we show that this set is convex and its extreme points are the functions that generate the following voting systems: simple majority, absolute majority, unanimous majority and Pareto majority. Moreover, we suggest a simple method for choosing a voting system when two alternatives are under consideration.
    Palabras Clave
    Voting systems
    ISSN
    1434-4742
    Revisión por pares
    SI
    DOI
    10.1007/s10058-013-0146-x
    Patrocinador
    Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Project ECO2012-32178) and ERDF
    Version del Editor
    https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-013-0146-x
    Propietario de los Derechos
    Springer
    Idioma
    eng
    URI
    http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/36226
    Derechos
    restrictedAccess
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    • DEP20 - Artículos de revista [112]
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