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    Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar este ítem:https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/58449

    Título
    Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling
    Autor
    Izquierdo Millán, Segismundo SamuelAutoridad UVA Orcid
    Izquierdo, Luis R.
    Año del Documento
    2023
    Editorial
    Elsevier
    Descripción
    Producción Científica
    Documento Fuente
    Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 138, 2023, Pages 126-142
    Abstract
    We consider population games played by procedurally rational players who, when revising their current strategy, test each of their available strategies independently in a series of random matches –i.e., a battery of tests–, and then choose the strategy that performed best in this battery of tests. This revision protocol leads to the so-called payoff-sampling dynamics (aka test-all Best Experienced Payoff dynamics). In this paper we characterize the support of all the rest points of these dynamics in any game and analyze the asymptotic stability of the faces to which they belong. We do this by defining strategy sets closed under payoff sampling, and by proving that the identification of these sets can be made in terms of simple comparisons between some of the payoffs of the game.
    Palabras Clave
    Closed under payoff sampling
    Payoff sampling
    Muestreo de pago
    ISSN
    0899-8256
    Revisión por pares
    SI
    DOI
    10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.006
    Version del Editor
    https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825622001762?via%3Dihub
    Propietario de los Derechos
    © 2022 Elsevier
    Idioma
    eng
    URI
    https://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/58449
    Tipo de versión
    info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
    Derechos
    openAccess
    Collections
    • BioEcoUVa - Artículos de revista [187]
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    Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 InternacionalExcept where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional

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